These days, although, the notion of a dwelling fossil has fallen on exhausting instances. This nicely intentioned “academic” video from the PBS Eons collection displays a broadly (although not universally) shared skepticism in regards to the very concept of a dwelling fossil. In recent times, quite a lot of essential research (like this one or this one) have raised doubts about whether or not paradigmatic dwelling fossil taxa need to be thought-about dwelling fossils in any respect. If we had been fallacious about these paradigm circumstances like coelacanths and cycads, which may point out that there’s something irretrievably tousled in regards to the very notion of a dwelling fossil.
I generally surprise if one of many issues that makes scientists so cautious of speaking about dwelling fossils is that creationists have been recognized to misappropriate the idea. If you perform a little searching across the web, you could find creationist websites that often deal with dwelling fossils as proof that evolution doesn’t happen. After all, that is badly mistaken in two methods: First, morphological stasis with respect to some fossilized traits continues to be appropriate with an excessive amount of evolutionary change occurring below the geological radar. Second, the place it does happen, stasis itself is simply an evolutionary sample—an explanatory problem, to make sure, however one which evolutionary idea has the sources to fulfill. We will clarify stasis by invoking habitat monitoring, stabilizing choice, developmental concerns, inhabitants construction, and even the differential extinction threat of ecological specialists vs. generalists. Residing fossils subsequently provide no help or consolation in any way to the creationist. Nonetheless, I’m wondering if some scientists may choose that it’s simpler to declare ‘dwelling fossil’ an illegitimate idea than to proceed deploying it whereas additionally taking countermeasures towards misunderstanding and misappropriation. Though I can perceive this impulse, a part of me feels prefer it concedes an excessive amount of. The truth that some individuals misappropriate or misunderstand a scientific idea doesn’t appear to be motive to jettison that idea if there are methods of placing it to productive work.
On this context, Scott Lidgard and Alan Love’s contribution final month is extraordinarily welcome. In case you haven’t already learn their essay, test it out! Additionally, right here is the extra technical, peer-reviewed model of their argument. I be part of them enthusiastically of their effort to rehabilitate the dwelling fossil idea. My objective right here, although, is to construct on their argument by bringing one thing into play that they pass over: The dwelling fossil idea has an simply missed normative dimension. The lesson of the metasequoia second is that calling one thing a ‘dwelling fossil’ means saying one thing about its worth.
Lidgard and Love argue that there are two very different types of cognitive work that we would ask ideas reminiscent of “dwelling fossil” to do.
On the one hand, we would need the idea to do the work of classification. Some taxa reside fossil taxa. Others aren’t. And what we’d like is a set of standards for distinguishing the dwelling fossils from the remainder. The issue, nevertheless, is that there are fairly quite a lot of completely different standards related to the time period, and completely different scientists appear to use completely different requirements in numerous circumstances, leading to unproductive “definitional debates.” Lidgard and Love argue that the broadly shared worries in regards to the legitimacy of the dwelling fossil idea derive from pessimism about whether or not it would ever be capable to do that first kind of work successfully.
Extra constructively, Lidgard and Love recommend that “the dwelling fossil idea may be understood as setting an built-in agenda for analysis.” The completely different standards for dwelling fossil-hood may be reinterpreted as selecting out phenomena that stand in want of rationalization, and as fixing explanatory expectations. Reasonably than worrying a lot about whether or not some taxon “actually” does or doesn’t depend as a dwelling fossil, in keeping with some contested definition, it will be much more productive, research-wise, to make use of the standards related to the dwelling fossil idea to assist information and construction ongoing investigation. Thus, the second kind of labor that the dwelling fossil idea may do (messy although it could be) is forward-looking and pragmatic. And in contrast to the primary, this can be a kind of labor to which the idea is nicely suited.
There are solely two species of coelacanth in existence, each belonging to the genus Latimeria. One lives within the Indian Ocean, of the japanese coast of South Africa, whereas the opposite lives in Indonesian waters. The South African coelacanths are few in quantity, and extremely endangered. What ought to we predict if an organization proposed to drill for oil of their habitat? (This isn’t hypothetical.) Maybe coelacanths must be given comparatively excessive precedence for conservation as a result of they’re dwelling fossils. Maybe being a dwelling fossil confers some worth. However why precisely ought to this be so?
One believable reply is that we care about phylogenetic variety or evolutionary distinctiveness. Phylogenetic variety is a mind-set about biodiversity that goes past merely counting species. The tough concept is that we should always care about how a lot of the tree of life is represented in an ecosystem. Suppose, for instance, that now we have an ecosystem with 4 species of beetles. Now take into account two attainable interventions we might make:
(1) introduce one other species of beetle that’s intently associated to those already there.
(2) introduce a species of dragonfly.
Each interventions have the identical affect on biodiversity, understood as mere species richness, since each convey the species depend in our ecosystem to 5. Now we would say that that (2) provides extra variety—in some sense—than (1). However in that case, we’re primarily saying that there’s extra to biodiversity than mere species richness. One thing else issues, too. And one risk is that the one thing else has to do with family tree.
Suppose I’m having dinner with my mother and father. We might invite my brother alongside, or we might invite my cousin. Both approach, we will likely be a celebration of 4. But when we invite my cousin, there’s a sense during which our group will likely be extra numerous, for it would embody a broader swath of the household tree.
Is there any deep motive why we should always care about phylogenetic variety? I’m unsure it’s attainable to inform any terribly compelling moral story (whether or not ecocentric, biocentric, or anthropocentric) in regards to the worth of phylogenetic variety. That’s, it’s exhausting to see why (2) must be higher than (1) in an moral sense. (2) doesn’t make for much less struggling, or injustice, or frustration of the pursuits of dwelling issues, or no matter. However (2) might nicely be preferable on aesthetic grounds. The distinction between (1) and (2) is mainly historic and genealogical, and I’ve argued in an earlier publish that historical past issues to aesthetic worth.
With all of this in thoughts, here’s a fast argument:
P1. Phylogenetic variety has aesthetic worth.
P2. Residing fossil taxa contribute to phylogenetic variety.
C. The extinction of a dwelling fossil taxon would subsequently imply the lack of aesthetic worth.
P1 has some plausibility. However what about P2? A few of the paradigmatic dwelling fossil taxa fairly clearly contribute to phylogenetic variety. That is definitely the case with coelacanths and horseshoe crabs. (The latter, by the way, are additionally threatened by human exercise.) The coelacanths, for instance, are most likely extra intently associated to us than they’re to different acquainted ray-finned fish. And we must hint their evolutionary historical past approach again to the Devonian, some 400-390 million years in the past, to search out an ancestor that they share with some other dwelling species. Not all the standards for dwelling fossil-hood that Lidgard and Love focus on must do with phylogenetic variety. The purpose is simply that we are able to scarcely assist however convey our personal normative aesthetic pursuits to the research of dwelling fossils.
These reflections recommend that Lidgard and Love’s rethink of the dwelling fossil idea must be carried even additional. They focus solely on the idea’s significance to empirical scientific investigation. However the idea might also select taxa that we predict must be prioritized (on historic/aesthetic grounds) for conservation. The completely different standards for dwelling fossil-hood that Lidgard and Love take into account may do rather more than repair explanatory expectations or assist to pick evolutionary phenomena that want explaining. Additionally they categorical completely different normative aesthetic pursuits which have relevance to conservation biology.
For an especially clear and useful introduction to this concept, see James Maclaurin and Kim Sterelny, What’s Organic Variety?College of Chicago Press, 2008, pp. 135-142.
The thought experiment isn’t good, as a result of the dragonfly provides other forms of variety as nicely. For instance, it provides to the morphological disparity of the system.